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Dino Polska's margins are shrinking, but its rival is losing more ground

5 numbers: why Dino added 62 stores in a quarter Biedronka added three, the leverage gap between them, and what has to be true for a 16% return from here

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Scuttlebutt
Oct 03, 2026
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The Dutch Investors · Oct 2, 2026

Dino Polska's margins are shrinking, but its rival is losing more ground

Dino Polska's stock fell more than 18% in a single day after its full-year 2025 results, and it is down over 20% in the past year. The show revisits the thesis it first laid out when the Polish grocer was still a market favorite.

Most investors who loved a 30%-a-year compounder sell the moment margins compress. The Dutch Investors instead pulled the operating numbers apart to see whether the business itself, not just the stock, was actually breaking down.

"It was an absolute compounding machine."

The show built its original case on store visits by its own analyst inside Poland, tracking a company most US investors had never heard of years before the stock became a Substack favorite.

The full segment is covered here so you can skip it.

Here are the 5 numbers that matter.


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Key Takeaways

  • Dino's net profit margin fell from 5.5% in 2023 to 4.6% in 2025, even as revenue grew almost 15%

    • General and administrative costs jumped more than 74% year over year in the first half of 2026 on minimum-wage increases

  • Dino opened 62 new stores in a single quarter; Biedronka opened three

    • Dino reached 3,176 locations by mid-2026, after adding 283 stores in 2024 and 345 in 2025

  • Dino's like-for-like sales held at 0% while Biedronka's fell to -1.6% as food deflation hit Poland

  • Dino's net debt to EBITDA is basically zero, and the company still pays no dividend, plowing cash into new stores and rooftop solar

  • A 12% five-year IRR is the base case, built on 14% annual revenue growth and margins recovering toward 5.5%

1. The Original Thesis

The show opened by restating why it liked Dino Polska before the stock fell: a rural strategy almost no other grocer copied.

Dino built its edge in towns too small for its competitors to bother with

Dino focused on villages and small towns, often under 5,000 residents, where it was frequently the only modern supermarket in town. Every store followed the same layout, built by the company's own construction arm, which let it buy materials in bulk and open stores faster and cheaper than rivals. Dino also bought the land under its stores outright rather than leasing it, and it owns 100% of a meat-processing company that supplies a butcher counter in every location.

The capital-allocation discipline was unusual for a retailer

Dino paid no dividends and bought back no stock, instead reinvesting more than 90% of operating cash flow into new stores at a stated return on invested capital above 25%. Revenue compounded at roughly 30% a year between 2014 and 2023, with net profit margins above 5%, more than double the European retail standard.

"It was an absolute compounding machine." — The Dutch Investors

2. Three Headwinds At Once

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